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Summary Although the extent to which some nonhuman an-
imals understand mental states is currently under debate, attrib-
uting false beliefs has been considered to be beyond their limits.
A recent study by Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call, and Tomasello
(Science, 354, 110–114, 2016) shows that great apes pass a
false-belief task when they are tested with an anticipatory-
looking paradigm developed for nonverbal human infants.
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Humans are renowned for operating with a Btheory of mind.^ At
some point during development, we come to understand that
other humans are intentional beings whose behavior is driven
by mental states such as perceptions, beliefs, or knowledge. We
easily generalize our ability to nonhuman animals and predict
their behavior on the basis of what they may see, know, or want.
We also commonly assume that such an attribution is a typical
human ability, which exceeds the cognitive realm of (most) non-
human animals. Although hardly anyone questions that attribut-
ing mental states is cognitively sophisticated, intense debates
exist about whether this ability is genuinely unique to humans
or may also be found in some nonhuman animals (Heyes, 2015).
Recent conceptual and methodological advancements have
shifted the focus of discussion away from the question ofwhether
or not some animals might possess a theory of mind to the ques-
tion of which aspects of theory of mind can be found in those
animals (e.g., Call & Tomasello, 2008). A series of behavioral
experiments on chimpanzees produced converging evidence that
these apes can predict others’ behavior on the basis of an under-
standing of the others’ goals, perceptions, and knowledge states
in the context of food competition. Similar findingswere reported
for Rhesus macaques, suggesting that precursors of a human
theory of mind can be found in Old World monkeys. Perhaps
evenmore surprisingly, attribution of perception, knowledge, and
desire states has also been reported for food-caching birds such as
ravens and scrub jays, suggesting that elements of a theory of
mind might have evolved independently in distantly related tax-
onomic groups (Bugnyar, Reber, & Buckner, 2016). What is not
yet clear, however, is whether any of those animals can represent
others’ beliefs. From a cognitive point of view, belief attribution
is particularly interesting, because it requires recognizing that
others’ actions are driven not by reality but by beliefs about
reality, even when those beliefs are false.
In human children, false-belief understanding develops
around 4 years of age and is traditionally tested with versions
of the BSally-Ann^ task—that is, a puppet play in which children
must explicitly predict a mistaken puppet agent’s future actions.
Modified versions of the test use a nonverbal design and a child’s
spontaneous gaze response as a measure. The underlying as-
sumption of this paradigm is that children have a tendency to
look at a location in anticipation of an impending event—that is,
what they predict an agent will do, even when this agent may
hold a false belief about a situation. These studies have indicated
that implicit knowledge about others’ beliefs is already present in
2-year-old infants (Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007).
A recent study by Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call, and
Tomasello (2016) used this anticipatory-looking paradigm to
test for false-belief understanding in three species of apes.
Chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans watched short videos
on a monitor while their gaze was noninvasively recorded
using an infrared eyetracker. The general design and proce-
dure of the test was the same as in the study with infants
(Southgate et al., 2007). The scenarios shown in the videos,
however, were designed to be meaningful to apes and featured
competitive interactions for status and for a specific item. In
one scenario, an ape-like character (human dressed up as go-
rilla) hit a human trainer on the back and then hid itself in one
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of two haystacks; in the other scenario, the ape-like character
stole an item previously hidden by the human trainer and hid it
in a different location. In both scenarios, the trainer then
searched for the goal object (ape-like character or the hidden
item) in one of the two locations. The tested apes always saw
three video sequences per scenario in a row. The first two
sequences served as familiarization trials and established that
the object (e.g., the ape-like character) could be hidden in
either of the two locations, and that the human trainer would
search for it in its true location. In the final test sequence, the
human trainer was also present in the beginning and witnessed
the initial hiding of the object, before he briefly left the scene.
In contrast to the familiarization trials, the object was moved
from one location to the other, and eventually was removed
completely (e.g., the ape-like character moved from the left to
the right haystack, and finally left the scene). The object’s
movement between the locations could occur while the trainer
was still present or while he was already absent, creating dif-
ferences in the trainer’s beliefs about the object’s location; the
object’s complete retrieval, however, was always done in the
trainer’s absence, creating a false belief in the trainer about the
object’s presence in either condition. Upon his return, the hu-
man trainer ambiguously approached the two locations (e.g.,
centrally between the two haystacks) without providing any
directional cues. At this critical time point, the apes’ anticipa-
tory looks were assessed on the basis of their first looks to the
target location—that is, where the trainer would falsely be-
lieve the object to be, or the other location.
The majority of the apes indeed looked at the target location
first—that is, they accurately anticipated the goal-directed be-
havior of the human trainer who held a false belief. This result is
of high importance from conceptual and methodological points
of view: It not only extends the list of mental states that apes
have responded to in behavioral experiments, but for the first
time indicates that attributing reality-incongruent mental states
may be within the capacity of some nonhuman animals, at least
on an implicit level. The study also showswhat is possible when
renowned primate labs in Europe, Japan, and theUSA pool their
expertise and resources. One of the practical outcomes of this
collaboration was access to a fairly large sample size of around
40 apes, whichwas essential for applying a design developed for
human infants and detecting subtle differences in visual behav-
ior. In fact, about 1/4 of the subjects did not look at any of the
locations in the short test situation, and thus had to be omitted
from the analysis; for the remaining 29 subjects, a combined
analysis of the two scenarios yielded a statistically reliable result.
As was described above, the study features an excellent design
implementing several controls and using state-of-the-art
eyetracking technology, in much the same way as in studies
on human infants; the design also pays attention to biological
predispositions and the daily life experience of the apes, framing
the test scenarios in an ecologically relevant context.
Interestingly, no species difference could be detected, nor was
there any significant difference between the two false-belief
conditions (i.e., when the first movement of the object occurred:
with the trainer being either still present or already absent).
Possibly these results were affected by low statistical power,
but the variation between species and/or conditions was small.
The critical point of this type of study, however, is that it is
open to alternative, nonmental explanations, such as the
learned rule Bagents search for things where they last saw
them.^ The authors openly discuss this possibility and rightly
point out that this critique applies to any implicit false-belief
task that relies on a change of locations. They further argue that
a rule-based explanation using domain-general mechanisms of
attention, learning, and memory cannot account for the results
obtained in previous theory-of-mind-related experiments on
apes. This argumentation is intuitive, but it needs to be treated
as a working hypothesis and tested against submental alterna-
tives in future studies. The study presently discussed should
spark a new focus on how this enterprise can be achieved.
Given that the methodological critique applies to both ape
and infant studies, the authors rightly challenge the common
view that the ability to pass an implicit false-belief task is
specific to humans. Following the logic and interpretation of
the infant studies, we may argue that three species of great
apes show an implicit understanding of belief. From an
evolutionary perspective, elements of belief attribution may
thus go back to the last common ancestor between humans
and orangutans. Hence, the study by Krupenye et al. (2016)
not only sets new standards for studying false-belief attribu-
tion, but it represents a crucial step forward in our attempt to
understand the evolutionary emergence of theory of mind.
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